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ABSTRACT

This paper will show that copyright law conflicts with the First
Amendment in that the fair use doctrine is insufficient to protect the
fundamental rights and interests that underlie the First Amendment's
protection of speech. To do this, the paper will examine three primary
justifications of the First Amendment:
individual liberty, the
marketplace of ideas, and political participation. The paper will also
analyze multiple situations, in which parties bring copyright suits and
the defendants claim fair use, to determine whether the fair use doctrine
protects the First Amendment. This paper will show that if one accepts
either a marketplace of ideas or a personal expression justification for
the First Amendment, copyright law will lead to unacceptable results.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009

1

Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 3 [2009], Iss. 2, Art. 7
AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

[3:351

The limited purpose of copyright cannot justify the inroads into the Bill
of Rights from copyright law.
I. THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The maj or theories scholars use to justify the First Amendment,
while varying slightly amongst interpretations, are the individual selfexpression model, the market place model, and the political speech
model.' There are some additional models, but they are more reasonably
considered models of interpretation rather than policy justifications, such
as Scalia's original intent doctrine of interpretation. 2
The self-expression model focuses on the individual, and the good
that it generates accrues to individuals. 3 The truth-seeking marketplace
theory is focused on society in general.4 It claims that as individuals
express ideas, the ideas will compete with each other for adherents, as do
products in marketplaces.'
The marketplace achieves the good by
filtering out the untrue to get to the true ideas.6 The third is the most
limited, and its good is solely political.7 It posits that the First
Amendment only operates to protect political speech so that individuals
maintain some degree of self-governance.8
A.

The Self-Expression Model

The self-expression model has several key characteristics. The first
is that it is centered on the value to the individual and not a social or
marketplace value. 9 It also applies broadly to nonverbal expressive
conduct.' 0 And while nonverbal expression has not always enjoyed the
broadest protection from the courts", even the most adverse rulings do
not disclaim nonverbal expression entirely' 2, extending it as far as nude

1. Thomas Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the FirstAmendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877,
878-79 (1963).
2. See Nancy McCahan, Comment, Justice Scalia's Constitutional Trinity, 41 St. Louis L.J.
1435 (1997).
3. Emerson, supra note lat 879-81.

4. Id. at 881-82.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 882-84.

8. Id.
9. See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L.

REv. 964 (1978).
10. Id.
11. See U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
12. Id.
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dancing.1 3 Dissents have even gone quite far in claiming that purely
nonverbal expressive conduct is deserving of full First Amendment

protections. 4

Recognition of the value of self-expression goes at least as far back
as ancient Greece.' 5 Aristotle, in Nicomachean Ethics, attempts to
explain the good and moral life. 16 He assigns one of the highest values
to what could reasonably be called an applied art of living. 7 Aristotle
governance, even
explicitly places the value of art above that of political
18
though he gives a high degree of value to politics.

Professor Sheldon Nahmod claims that individual self-expression
and artistic expression have a strong foundation in philosophy.' 9 One of
the most important philosophical anchors of individual artistic
expression as a First Amendment value that Nahmod cites is the
aesthetic theory of Kant. 20 Kant argued that creative expression itself
was a good. 2' Nahmod also holds the Greeks responsible for relegating
artistic expression to a secondary role behind political expression in First
Amendment doctrine and Western Law in general.2 2 He argues that
Plato's hierarchy of the forms placed representational speech and
communication above non-representational speech and communication.23
Plato's theory also valued political speech above other forms of
representational communication.2 a This marginalization of the merely
beautiful in favor of the political survived in Western thought through
the Middle Ages, largely due to the Catholic Church and the theology of
St. Augustine. 25 The importance that political speech held over the
aesthetic extended from that point, expanding rapidly during the late
Middle Ages and the Renaissance and almost entirely vanquishing non-

13. Schad v. Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981). "Furthermore, as the state courts in this
case [Schad v. Mt. Ephraim] recognized, nude dancing is not without its First Amendment
protections from official regulation."
14. Young v. Arkansas, 474 U.S. 1070, 1072 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
15. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Terence Irwin trans., Hackett 2d ed. 1999).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1801.
18. Id.
19. Sheldon Nahmod, Artistic Expression and Aesthetic Theory: The Beautiful Sublime and
the FirstAmendment, 1987 WiS. L. REv. 221, 221.
20. Id. at 229-30.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 221.
23. Id. at 226-27. This put literal painting and speech above music or abstract artwork.
24. Id. at 227.
25. Id. at 228.
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representational communication within Western thought by the time of
the Enlightenment.2 6
In addition to the importance of being able to experience and create
the beautiful, unfettered communication has value to individuals outside
of aesthetics. Government censorship of individual speech has had
disastrous effects for social and familial life in totalitarian countries.2 7
Writers from Orwell to Solzhenitsyn 28 have decried its effects. Judge
Learned Hand comes down squarely for personal expression as an
essential element of the good life in his writing on Thomas Jefferson in
Sources of Tolerance.29
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer advocates a modern strain of
this model.3 ° He lays out his theory of constitutional law in Active
Liberty.3 1 He claims an absolutist theory of speech would be as
ineffective as the absolutist theories of the Lochner era, because it would
not allow the public to regulate areas of law like warranties and
campaign finance. 32 For Justice Breyer, the middle ground is individual
participation. 33 This may sound more similar to the second model, the
marketplace of ideas, but the important distinction is where the good of
both theories is focused.34 The individual liberty theory says the good
(or right) of the individual participating is important. 35 The marketplace
theory says the good is that individual participation is most likely to get
either good government or truth.36 For Justice Breyer, campaign finance
legislation indirectly leads to good government, but does it by way of the
individual participation and not the marketplace of ideas. 37 Campaign
finance does not by itself, make government function well, but by
decreasing the influence of major donors, it increases the influence of
ordinary people. 38 This increased influence, or diffusion of influence,

26. Id.
27. VACLAV HAVEL, POLITICS AND CONSCIENCE IN LIVING IN TRUTH 136-57, (Faber and

Faber 1986).
28. See ALEKSANDER SOLZEHENITSYN, THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO (Harper & Row 1974).
29. LEARNED HAND, SOURCES OF TOLERANCE IN THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 66, 69 (Irving

Dilliard ed., Alfred A. Knopf 1953).
30. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY (Alfred A. Knopf 2005).

31.
32.
33.
34.

Id..
Id. at40-41.
Id. at 42-43.
Emerson, supra note 1 at 878-82.

35. Id. at 879-81.

36. Id. at 881-82.
37.

BREYER, supra note 30, at 46-47.

38. Id. at 47.
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leads to increased participation in democracy. 39 The broad increase in
participation leads to good government. 40
B.

The Marketplace of Ideas Model

The justification that has had the most success in American law is
the "marketplace of ideas model." Since every theorist advances the
model with different permutations, it is impossible to pin down just one
version of it. However, major pillars and foundations are easy to find.
The first is John Stuart Mill's On Liberty.4 ' Mill wrote that laws or
policies limiting speech were robbery of the worst kind.42 The reason
the banning or 'theft' of disagreeing speech was so bad was because "if
the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging
error for truth: if wrong they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the
clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its
collision with error. '' 43 Mill's argument was that ideas would compete
with each other for adherents, and though not everyone would agree, the
continued competition would keep older ideas sharp, yet still allow for
new ideas. 44 On Liberty also contains an important counterargument
against anyone who advocates censorship.45 Any assertion that any one
idea is so much better than all the opposing ideas that critical speech
should be banned is an absolute claim.46 Not only is the advocate of
censorship saying, 'my idea is the best idea I have ever heard,' but they
are saying, 'my idea is the best idea I will ever hear.' 47 No one has
sufficient knowledge to make such an absolute claim, because to do so
would require proving an endless series of negatives.4 8 The advocates of
censorship are making the jump from 'better' to 'best possible,' and
'best possible' requires more knowledge of all possible ideas than they
could possibly have, hence the endless series of 'better' arguments the
advocates of censorship would have to prove to justify their assertion
that their idea is the best idea possible.4 9 Mill also makes an historical

39. Id.
40. Id.
41.

JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Everyman's Library 2d ed. 1992). For prior history see

supranotes 10 through 19.
42. Id.at 33.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 34.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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argument that the periods of rapid intellectual development were during
breaks in authority over thought and speech.5 ° A fourth argument
contained within the small, but incredibly fertile, chapter on freedom of
thought in On Liberty is that even if one could find an infallible idea, it
would become weakened if not challenged and fade to the point of not
being knowledge, but just a hollow repetition of what others have said."'
52
Modem philosophy has kept many of the central themes of Mill's.

Modem philosophers, such as Jurgen Habermass and Bruno Latour,
have kept the marketplace theory of ideas, as illustrated by Mill, or some
similar variation of it at the forefront of political philosophy.53
Mill's arguments, while certainly not adopted wholesale by the
judiciary, are central to the roots of modem American First Amendment
law. The dissents, concurrences, and eventual majority opinions of
Justices Holmes and Brandeis, as well as Judge Hand, form the
framework of the marketplace theory in American law. In Masses, the
U.S. Postmaster refused to mail the plaintiff's magazine because it
violated a law banning statements that interfered with the military. 4
Judge Hand's opinion in Masses was one of the earliest victories for
broad protection of speech. 55 The decision adopts a modified version of
Mill's absolutist argument for the specific portion of the statute that
related to false statements.56 Judge Hand says that to construe false
statements so broadly would outlaw opinion. 57 He then goes on to make
a similar argument about the scope of causation between speech and
actions. "Yet to interpret the word 'cause' so broadly would, as before,
involve necessarily as a consequence the suppression of all hostile
criticism, and of all opinion except what encouraged and supported the
existing policies., 58 Judge Hand is essentially arguing that the law must
be interpreted to avoid constitutional problems and to do that requires
interpreting 'cause' narrowly. Otherwise the law's suppression of

50. Id.at 63 (referencing Germany during the intellectual development of Goethe and Fichte).
51. Id.
52. See BRUNO LATOUR, POLITICS OF NATURE (Harvard University Press 2004); JURGEN
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND
DEMOCRACY (Cambridge University Press 1996).
53. Id. The differences between Mill's classical liberalism and these philosophers,
communitarians, and group choice theorists, while important, are all much smaller than their
similarities when it comes to just the importance of state limits on speech, since none actually
challenge the importance of the flow of ideas.
54. Masses Pub'g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 535 (D.N.Y. 1917), rev'd,246 F. 24.
55. See id
56. Id.at 539.
57. Id.
58. Id.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol3/iss2/7

6

Buchanan: If Hip-Hop Were Classified and the Pentagon Papers Had Been Copyrighted
2009]

IF Hip-Hop WERE CLASSIFIED AND THE PENTAGON PAPERS HAD BEEN COPYRIGHTED

357

opinion would be unconstitutional because would interfere with
The trial court's broad interpretation of
democratic governance.
causation would make the law criminalize all but agreement with
existing policy. However, the protection afforded by Judge Hand proved
short-lived, as the appellate court reversed the decision. 9
Justice ° Holmes, in his dissent in Abrams, adopted similar
arguments.

The first was the strict construction of the statute to

61

exclude opinion.6' Justice Holmes then goes on to make a very direct
case for First Amendment values.62
The ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas -- that
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon
which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the
theory of our Constitution. 63
And while Abrams and similar dissents were not immediately
adopted, these dissents ultimately became the winning side of the
debate. 64 The Supreme Court now regularly refers to the marketplace
theory of ideas when debating First Amendment issues.65
C.

The PoliticalSpeech Model

A third theoretical model of the First Amendment is that it bars
government censorship of political speech. Very few adherents of this
interpretation say that this is all the First Amendment does, but they
usually limit their arguments to avoid complications from commercial
speech and obscenity. By itself, the model would hardly be worth
discussing because the other two models include it, but even the
constitutional theories that disagree with the political speech model and
modern constitutional history have given political speech a pride of
place. So it is worthy of discussion, not because it is a robust model, but
because of its role in almost all other theories.

59. Masses Publ'g. Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24, 24.
60. Abrams v. U.S. 250 U.S. 616,624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at627.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 630.
64. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). This case also contains a
comprehensive review of the various Brandeis-Holmes dissents, and their eventual transition to the
result in this case.
65. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
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Justice Breyer gives the ban of political speech that extraordinary
prominence in Active Liberty.66 The cases that formed the marketplace
theory were all cases of speech critical of the government.67 Even local
zoning laws, which ostensibly have almost nothing to do with speech,
are struck down by the courts once the prohibited speech is political, like
Summit Republican Party Chairman Alex Arshinkoff's giant "Bush
2004" sign that violated Hudson's zoning regulations.68
D.

CopyrightLaw and the FairUse Defense

Copyright law is an explicit constitutional power of Congress.69
"To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries., 70 This clause's style is rare in the
Constitution, because it explicitly states the purpose that the legislature
should adopt copyright laws to advance. Congress has adopted many
statutes that allow "exclusive rights" to people and corporations for
everything from chemical compounds and genetics to business
methods. 7' Congress also included an explicit defense called fair use for
certain categories of infiringing materials.72
It is easy to see how the copyright power itself could come into
conflict with core First Amendment values. Just imagine if the President
were able to copyright his "State of the Union" speech and sue on
exclusive use grounds if it were ever quoted disparagingly. A candidate
or elected official who copyrighted all her speeches and sued anyone
who made negative remarks about those speeches that included critical
quotes could stifle a large amount of political debate.73 The search for
truth outside the political would also be impeded because all quotes of
copyrighted work, positive or critical, could be grounds for a copyright
suit. The New York Review of Books and the whole book reviewing
industry would shut down overnight. Individual freedom of expression
would also be affected; parody and reference in artistic works would be
seriously limited. If the Bible had been within copyright hundreds of
years of literary and artistic expression would have been infiinging

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See supra text accompanying notes 29-39.
See supra text accompanying notes 53-57.
See City of Hudson v. Arshinkoff, 2005 Ohio 6976 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
Id.
17 U.S.C. § 101-122.
17 U.S.C. § 107.
See infra notes 236-37 and accompanying text for the Judge who did just this.
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because they have depended on the Bible for their references, allusions,
and narratives. Both the musical Wicked and the movie Apocalypse Now
are contemporary works that depend on reference for their power in a
way that exclusive use would make impossible.74 Fortunately, some of
these obvious problems are mitigated by the fair use defense. Many
courts even say these problems are completely solved by the fair use
defense.
The most important part of copyright law for the purpose of this
paper is the fair use exception, because it is one of the two strongest
protections for First Amendment values in existing copyright law. The
Supreme Court made this importance explicit in Harper & Row
Publishers v. Nation Enters, by pointing out that the copyright act took
at least some account of the First Amendment, "[i]n view of the First
Amendment protections already embodied in the Copyright Act's
distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts
and ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally
afforded by fair use. 76 Fair use, like copyright, has its roots in an
explicit statute.7 7 Considering the short length of the statute and its
importance to the analysis, it is worth quoting in nearly its entirety.
The fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified
by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the
use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be
considered shall include-(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.

74. Wicked is based on The Wizard of Oz by Frank Baum and Apocalypse Now is based
loosely on Joseph Conrad's Heart of Darkness.
75. Wainwright Sec. Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 1977).
76. Harper & Row Publishers. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985). Reference to the
idea-expression dichotomy omitted.
77. 17U.S.C.§107.
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The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of
fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above
factors.78
When Congress enacted the fair use statute, the proponents were
primarily concerned with creating a statutory framework for existing law
and future decisions,
[t]he bill endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial
doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in
the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological change.
Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and some
of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the
doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis. Section 107 is
intended to restate the present judicial 79doctrine of fair use, not to
change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way.
The House Committee was also interested in maintaining fair use
for educational purposes.8 0 Members of the committee also expressed
concerned about how copyright would affect newsgathering.8 1
Since the fair use statute is simple, it has been up to the courts to
make many major decisions about how to interpret its four factors. The
one thing that has never been questioned is that since it is an affirmative
defense, the burden of proof rests on the defendant.82 The first factor is
important, but not controlling. The Supreme Court held, in Luther
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, that a profitable parody does not mean it cannot
be fair use. 3 Rather than laying out bright line rules of interpretation,
the Supreme Court pointed out where the appellate court went wrong.84
Justices also engaged in substantive discussion, but said, "The task is not
to be simplified with bright line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it
recognizes calls for case by case analysis. 85
In Campbell, 2 Live Crew released a song entitled "Pretty Woman"
that was a parody of Roy Orbison's "Oh, Pretty Woman. 8 6 2 Live Crew
initially made an offer to pay a fee for the use of the song as well as give

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
17 U.S.C.S. § 107 HOUSE REP. No. 94-1476 (1976).
Id.
Id.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 590 (U.S. 1994).
Id. at 583-84.
Id.
Id. at 577 (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539, 560).
Id. at 560.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol3/iss2/7

10

Buchanan: If Hip-Hop Were Classified and the Pentagon Papers Had Been Copyrighted
2009] IF Hip-Hop WERE CLASSIFIED AND THE PENTAGON PAPERS HAD BEEN COPYRIGHTED

361

written credit to the original author.8 7 Acuff-Rose replied that they
"cannot permit4'the use of a parody of 'Oh, Pretty Woman'. ,88
The district court ruled for 2 Live Crew saying that a commercial
recording was not barred from utilizing the fair use defense, and that the
lyrics quickly became different and did more to highlight the difference
between the two styles than rely on the similarities. 89 The district court
also found that 2 Live Crew took little more of the song than was
required and that it was extremely unlikely the 2 Live Crew recording
would affect the commercial viability of the Orbison song.90 The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, saying that the district court failed to
take into account the presumption that "every commercial use is
unfair." 91 The Sixth Circuit also claimed that since the market use factor
was the most important factor, a commercial use of the infringing song
showed a presumption of market harm for the original copyright.92
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit, saying that its
argument about presumption was wrong. 93 The Supreme Court then
analyzed the four factors itself.94 For the first factor, the Court relies
heavily on two arguments, the first being the language of the fair use
statute, as well as the intent of the copyright statute.95 The statute says,
"such as" 96 indicating that the list at the beginning of possible uses is
merely an example and not comprehensive.97 The second question used
to determine whom the first factor favors is whether the infringing work
is transformative.98 This harkens back to the original purpose of
copyright, "the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is
generally furthered by the creation of transformative works." 99 The
Court goes on to say that this transformative quality is weighted
inversely to the other factors, so the more transformative, the less other
factors matter. 00 It is important to note that while the Court applies fair

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 572.
Id. at 573.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 573-74.
Id.
Id. at 584.
Id. at 577-94.
Id. at 578-79.
17 U.S.C. § 107.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
Id. at 579.
Id.
Id.
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use to a parody in this case, there is no presumption that parody is
transformative or fair use.' 0 '
The second factor, the nature of the original work, is almost
completely ignored in this case. The Court merely says that certain
because they are at the "core of
aspects of a work are more protected
02
protection.'
copyright
intended
The Court's analysis for the third factor begins by quoting Justice
Joseph Story's interpretation of the factor, "the quantity and value of the
materials used."' 3 Once again, the Court says any analysis on this point
will be case-by-case and must go back to the purpose of the use. 1°4 The
Court also says an important question is whether the amount and
substantiality of the infringing parts lead to the infiinging work
becoming a substitute for the original.'0 5
For the fourth factor, the Supreme Court held that it was not simply
a question of whether the original would sell less, but rather it also
included whether the conduct in question, if widespread and
unrestricted, would result in a substantial impact on the market
generally. 10 6 This interpretation broadened the inquiry to include the
potential consequences for other actors in the market, in addition to the
copyright holder and the infringer. However, the Court said it was not
simply a market consideration alone, because an infringement eligible
for fair use could be designed to cripple the market for the original work,
like an intensely negative review.'0 7 It stated, "the rule of the Court is to
distinguish between 'biting criticism [that merely] suppresses demand
[and] copyright infringement [, which] usurps it."' 08 Conversely, an
infringement that leads to a massive increase in sales for the original
work could not be used as a counterbalancing factor for the defendant in
the fair use defense analysis. 0 9
II. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT
Now that we have some understanding of fair use and the First
Amendment, we can begin analysis of the conflict itself. No court has

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.at 581.
Id.at586.
Id.(quoting Folsom v. Aarsh).
Id. at 586-87.
Id. at 587.
Id. at 590.
Id.at 591-92.
Id.at 592. (citing Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986)).
Id.at 591.
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held that the First Amendment, outside of fair use, is a valid defense to a
copyright infringement claim."10 By the same token, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
the most recent Supreme Court decision on fair use and the First
Amendment, left open a very narrow door that someday a copyright law
could be invalidated by the First Amendment, saying, "the D.C. circuit
spoke too broadly when it declared copyrights categorically immune
Prior to the Eldred
from challenges under the First Amendment.' ' .
decision, the courts had generally sided against First Amendment
defenses in copyright suits. The courts have often relied on disclaiming
12
that a conflict even exists between First Amendment and copyright.'
The negative treatment First Amendment defenses have received can be
seen in Eldredv. Ashcroft and Harper& Row v. Nation.
One of the Supreme Court's most important decisions on the
conflict is Harper& Row v. Nation Enter. In that case, President Ford
sold his memoirs to Harper & Row, which then negotiated an agreement
for a prepublication excerpt to appear in Time. 1 3 The Nation obtained a
copy of the manuscript and quickly produced a story excerpting 300 to
400 words about Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon verbatim from Ford's
memoirs.1 4 Time canceled their prepublication agreement, and Harper
& Row sued The Nation for copyright infringement. 5 The Nation's
defense claimed both fair use and First Amendment protections. 1 6 The
D.C. Circuit found for Harper & Row, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed and found fair use. 1 7 The Supreme Court then
reversed the appellate court, finding no fair use." 8
The Supreme Court used multiple arguments in its ruling for
Harper & Row. 19 One of the central arguments for dismissing The
Nation's broadest First Amendment defense was the idea/expression
distinction.120 The idea/expression distinction is the doctrine that no idea
itself may be copyrighted but individual expressions may be.12 1 For

110.
IlI.

18 Am.J. 2d Copyrightand LiteraryProperty§ 238.
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2002). For a full discussion of Eldred,see supra

note and accompanying text.
112. Michael Bimhack, Copyright Law and Free Speech After Eldred v. Ashcroft, 76 S.CAL.
L. REv. 1275, 1287 (2003).
113. Harper & Row,471 U.S. at 542-43.
114. Id.at543-48.
115. Id.at543.
116. Id.at544, 555.
117. Id.at 544.

118. Id.at569.
119.
120.
121.

Id. 546-69.
Id.at 559-60.
Id. at 556.
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example, one could copyright a specific story about adultery, but not the
idea of adultery. This is believed to provide protection to First
Amendment values by leaving all 'ideas' free of copyright protection
and allowing anyone to talk about them as they wish, provided they
express them in some non-infringing manner.' 22 The Court does not
examine this distinction in depth as it simply states the idea/expression
distinction. 23 The Court also unintentionally blurs the distinction itself
when discussing the newsworthiness of the article24 by saying that the
words themselves may be newsworthy in this case.'
Another argument the Court made relied on the incentives for
25
publishing information about public figures and newsworthy events.
It argued that if there were a broader fair use exception for public
figures, the information the public most needed to know about public
126
figures would be unlikely to be published in profit-seeking memoirs.
The Court then frets about the possibility of a "parade of horribles,"
quoting an ASCAP conference report that argued, "[i]f every volume
that was in the public interest could be pirated away by127a competing
publisher.. .the public would have nothing worth reading."'
The court also discusses the right not to speak as a fundamental
First Amendment value. 2 ' The right not to speak is a negative right that
the Court uses to defend prepublication silence in copyright cases. 129 If
this were a true right copyright, the First Amendment, and plans of
publication together, would become a monopoly mechanism if the
author just claimed he never wanted to speak at all. 3 ° In addition to
that, the Court may be on weak ground with this argument for a right to
silence because the precedent they cite is mere dicta. The Estate of
Hemingway v. Random House, the case the Court cites for the right to

122. Id
123. Id.at 559-60..
124. Id.at 557. That the Supreme Court confuses this distinction is fairly solid evidence that
its value may be overstated.
125. Id. at 559.
126. Id.
127. Id.(citing Sobel, Copyright and the FirstAmendment: A GatheringStorm?, 19 ASCAP
COPYRIGHT LAW SYMPOSIUM 43, 78 (1971)). Apparently, in his hysterics, Mr. Sobel forgot the
quality of reading material like Shakespeare, Dante, Milton and the Bible that has slipped into the
public domain. Though of course none of that is 'worth reading' when compared with the literary
tour de force that is Ford's memoirs.
128. Id.at 559.
129. Id.
130. This argument seems very unpersuasive as it relates to this case, but it represents an
interesting First Amendment position worth commenting on, as it becomes important later in the
paper when the analysis is switched.
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silence, mentioned the possibility of such a right, but actually reached
the opposite conclusion in its ultimate holding because the speaker,
lost the case and Random House published the
Ernest Hemingway,
131
material.
The Court also goes through all four factors of the fair use statute as
they apply to this case. 32 The first factor was found to weigh against
The Nation.'33 While the defendant argued that the purpose was news,
the Court said The Nation misunderstood the first factor. 134 The
question was not the motive, which may have been news, but, rather,
whether the infringer stood to gain from copyrighted material without
paying for it. 135 The Court also found the second factor failed to support
the defendants. 36 The Court almost accepted The Nation's argument on
37
the first factor of motive and purpose here, but used it against them.
The Court ruled that the purpose of the infringement was to scoop
Time.13 8 It is interesting to note that the Court specifically states that
quality control was an important part of the plaintiff's problem with
being scooped. 39 This focus on quality control is potentially very
damaging to First Amendment values as it could let copyright create a
shield for public officials to ensure a positive spin on any published facts
about their official actions, like the pardon in this case. This is
especially true if quality control is broadly construed, as it was in this
case, to include the defensive contextualizing of the questionable actions
surrounding the Nixon pardon that Ford included in his memoir. The
third factor also favored the plaintiff.' 4 The Court ruled that the
Watergate portion of the memoir, while only amounting to a few
hundred words, was the core of Ford's material.' 4' The Court's decision
is based largely on the fair use statute and has no discussion of
underlying First Amendment values the decision would implicate. The
only First Amendment values discussed were the negative right of
silence, personal economic profit, and quality control incentives that
copyright supposedly supports. Essentially, the court relies on the profit

131.

Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 348 (N.Y. 1968).

132. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560-61.

133. Id. at 562.
134.
135.

Id.
Id.

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id.
Id.at562.
ld. at 564.
Id. at 564-65.

141.

Id.
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motive and the opportunity for self-justification on the part of public
officials as sufficient mechanisms to put political news into the public
sphere.
There was a significant dissent by Justice Brennan in Harper &
Row. 42 His dissent argues that not only is the majority's holding
opposed to the original purpose of copyright and fair use, but that the
material was not infringing at all. 143 This interpretation is important
because it indirectly attacks the idea/expression dichotomy. Justice
Brennan does this by saying the facts that underlay the quotations in
question are not original and not copyrightable. 44 The quotes are still
copyrightable, but since the majority of the Nation article is a summary
of historical fact, there was no taking.1 45 The area outside copyright that
allows the free discussion of ideas mandates that expression cannot be
read as broadly as the majority does; it has to be a question of substantial
copying for the expression to be infringed upon. 46 Justice Brennan is
also willing to let some of the consequences of this be borne by the
author, saying directly "[c]opyright thus does not protect that which is
often of most value in a work of history., 147 There is an implicit
balancing here informed by the same concerns that underlay the dissent
in Eldred,that when the public interest concerns regarding copyright and
the First Amendment are weighed against the commercial incentive of
the author, sometimes the author will lose.
The difference between the Supreme Court's majority opinion and
Justice Brennan's dissent's balancing of the economic incentives shows
a sharp contrast on what should be considered an economic incentive
and how they should be valued. Under the Court's balancing of the
economic incentives, the author or creator never loses on First
Amendment grounds unless they are unharmed economically. The
majority never seems to consider the possibility that Ford could lose the
case despite winning the economic balancing test. The economic
incentives are just too central for them to admit that possibility. On the
but still losing the
other hand, Ford winning on economic incentives,
148
Brennan.
Justice
for
outcome
case is a possible

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 579 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id.at 580 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
dissenting).
Id (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
Id (Brennan, J.,
Id.at 583-84 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
dissenting).
Id.at 589 (Brennan, J.,
Id.
at 592 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol3/iss2/7

16

Buchanan: If Hip-Hop Were Classified and the Pentagon Papers Had Been Copyrighted
2009] IF Hip-Hop WERE CLASSIFIED AND THE PENTAGON PAPERS HAD BEEN COPYRIGHTED

367

After Harper & Row, Eldred is the most important case for any
discussion of how the Supreme Court is presently resolving the conflict
between the First Amendment and copyright law. Congress passed the
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 (CTEA), extending the length of
copyrights to 70 years from the death of their creator. 49 Eldred brought
suit on behalf of libraries, corporations, and others that made use of
materials when they slipped into the public domain. 5 ° Eldred advanced
two separate arguments: one was that the 20-year extension on existing
copyrights was not valid, and the second was that the act itself should be
subject to content neutral scrutiny under the First Amendment. 15 The
assumption Eldred relied on for this argument was that if the law were
subjected to content neutral scrutiny, it would fail, and be declared
unconstitutional. 152 Very little in the first argument is relevant to the
First Amendment, so it does not need to be summarized in much depth,
but there are a few points of interest in that discussion. The Court holds
that the preamble to the copyright clause is not a limit on Congressional
power. 53 It also holds that how best to achieve the clause's goal is a
legislative judgment.1 5 4 This is important because it means that once the
court determines a law is enacted on the copyright clause authority, it is
subject to a judicial analysis very similar to the least restrictive means
test. So as long as the law accomplishes the legislative intent of
Congress and is reasonably limited, it will not be held to a higher
standard of scrutiny. However if the Court thought that the same law
restricted First Amendment rights it would be held to a higher standard
of scrutiny. That increased scrutiny would be applied regardless of what
enumerated power of Congress the law had been enacted under. The
Court also makes use of the idea/expression distinction saying, "[a]
reader of an author's writing
may make full use of any fact or idea she
' 55
reading."'
her
from
acquires
The more important argument for First Amendment purposes is that
the CTEA should be treated as a content neutral regulation of speech.
First, the Court argues that because the copyright clause and the First
Amendment were adopted at roughly the same time, "in the Framers'

149.

Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193.

150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 218.
153. Id. at211.
154. Id.at212.
155. Id. at 217. But it is not clear this is in agreement with Harper & Row, and even if it is
narrowly, how does one make use of the fact that the president lied without the expression itself?
See supra discussion on failing idea expression distinction.
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view, copyright's limited monopolies are compatible with free speech
principles."' 156 The Court then repeats the idea/expression distinction
and says that it "strike[s] a definitional balance between the First
Amendment and the Copyright Act.' 57 The Court also includes a very
basic statement that fair use also takes account of First Amendment
concerns. 158 Essentially, the Court does not
resolve the conflict, as much
59
as it simply says the conflict cannot exist.
This decision came with a dissent that provided another perspective
on what the law should have been regarding copyright and the First
Amendment. 60 While dissents may not prevail at any given time,
countless constitutional doctrines have come from dissenting opinions of
just a single voice speaking against an otherwise hegemonic
jurisprudence to governing law. Justice Stevens' dissent argues that the
6
Court is understating the explicit limitation in the copyright clause.' '
The proper reading of the clause requires that copyrights go into the
public domain as quickly as possible while still preserving an impulse to
create.' 62 This means that the goal of the clause is to provide the bare
minimum of restriction necessary to provide incentive to copyright
owners to keep creating. Even while Congress and the courts could
draw that line in a few different places, it will necessarily stop short far
short of anything that amounts to an absolute or near absolute monopoly.
Justice Breyer's dissent makes the potential conflict between
copyright and the First Amendment explicit. 63 He argues that, under
most circumstances, the First Amendment and the Copyright Clause
work hand in hand.' 64 In his view, the Copyright Clause is the positive
aspect encouraging the flow of expression and the First Amendment is
the negative, preventing any blocks to the flow of information.1 65 He
also argues that concerns about the First Amendment in copyright cases
should be analyzed in depth, rather than the cursory review those

156. Id. at 219. This seems like a very simple dodge as it has not been advanced that because
article I through 3 were written at the same time they are simply 'compatible'.
157. Id.
158. Id. But they fail to actually present an argument for this point and cite to Harper& Row,
which actually limited the scope of the defense.
159. Michael Bimhack, Copyright Law and Free Speech After Eldred v. Ashcroft, 76 S.CAL.
L. REv. 1275 (2003).
160. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222-42 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 223-24 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
162. Id.at 224-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
163. Id.at 244 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
164. Id.(Breyer, J., dissenting).
165. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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concerns seem to be given inmany of the prior decisions. 66 Justice
Breyer then posits a three-part test for rational support for copyright
cases, saying,
I would find that the statute lacks the constitutionally necessary
rational support (1) if the significant benefits that it bestows are
private, not public; (2) if it threatens seriously to undermine the
expressive values that the Copyright Clause embodies; and (3) if67 it
cannot find justification in any significant Clause-related objective.1
While this test does not explicitly mention the First Amendment,
the First Amendment is implicated by the earlier analysis of Justice
Breyer. The First Amendment mandates the limits that are embodied in
the test, especially the first and second parts.
As the history of the conflict shows, no court has simply analyzed a
copyright law solely on First Amendment grounds. The courts usually
do not even get close to analyzing the two in conjunction with each
other. According to Professor Michael Birnhack, "[s]omething strange
happens to the First Amendment when it meets copyright law: it
disappears.' 68 There may be a good unspoken reason for this. If the
Courts fully analyzed the clash between copyright law and the First
Amendment, it would present a troublesome situation for existing First
Amendment doctrine: it would subject copyright to various aspects of
First Amendment doctrine that would lead to odd results. Professor
Rebecca Tushnet writes supports this point.169 She analyzes copyright
speech claims as compared to speech claims in other areas such as
pornography and finds that the courts offer a radically different version
of First Amendment analysis for copyright claims, one stripped of
70
almost all the distinctive doctrines of the First Amendment.
Obviously, the court could simply exempt copyright from many aspects
of existing First Amendment analysis. There is no law that says that all
court-developed doctrine would automatically apply in all constitutional
cases, but it is worth examining how those specific First Amendment
doctrines would change copyright law.

166. Id.(Breyer, J., dissenting).
167. Id.at 245 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
168. Michael Birnhack, The Copyright Law andFree Speech Affair: Making-up and breakingup, 43 IDEA 233,233.
169. See Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright has in
Common With Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications
Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV 1 (2000).
170. Id.
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The first, and possibly strangest, consequence would be an
overbreadth challenge to a copyright law. First Amendment law is
unique because a challenge to a law does not have to be as applied. The
defendant could be engaging in an act that of itself would be unprotected
under the law, but if the law is broad enough to affect protected activity,
that individual defendant can still challenge the constitutionality of the
law. This would allow even the worst copyright infringers the ability to
attack the law and win, if they could show it infringed on a protected
activity of a theoretical individual.
An aspect of First Amendment doctrine that may be even more
troublesome would be the near per se bar on injunctions. If Harper &
Row had filed suit earlier, the Court may have been willing to uphold an
injunction. Copyright violations are enjoinable offenses, but activities
protected by the First Amendment, even the worst forms of unprotected
libel, are generally not. 7' Some even question whether this different
standard for injunctions between other forms of unprotected speech,
such as libel, and copyrighted material is not already running afoul of
the constitutional prohibition on prior restraint.172 At this time, there has
not been a case on it, but Harper & Row points out the troubling
possibility that a public official could seek continuing injunctions on the
facts contained in her memoir under copyright law, as the official sought
a friendly publisher. 173 That could, for all practical purposes, shut down
discussion over many facts of great public importance.
The usual counterargument to this is the idea/expression distinction.
The Court simply assumes that this distinction protects First Amendment
values. Despite the distinction's long-standing pedigree, some have
questioned whether it is a coherent and valid concept. 174 Briefly
summarized, it is a basic linguistic distinction between the arrangement
of the words that the author creates and the ideas they signify or
represent.' 75 One can copyright a paragraph describing democracy, but
one cannot copyright the concept, or more generally, descriptions of
democracy. Supporters of the distinction argue that not only does it
protect the exchange of ideas by preventing ideas themselves from being
copyrighted, but it also contains a built-in exemption to copyright for

171. Volokh and Lemly, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual PropertyCases, 48
DUKE L.J. 147, 147 (1998).
172. Id. at 147-48.
173. Harper& Row, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
174. Edward Samuels, The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56 TENN. L. REV.
321, 323 (1989).
175. Id.
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specific instances where the idea and the expression merge: the merger
doctrine. 7 6 That is when the idea and expression come together as a
unity. 77 That would prevent 7copyrighting expressions where the ideas
'merged' with the expression. 8
Harper& Row, if it had been analyzed in more detail, would have
shown the problems with such a glib dichotomy. One of the most
prominent features of The Nation article was the Ford quote admitting
that he lied about his knowledge of Nixon's involvement in the
Watergate burglary. 179 What was newsworthy about the story was that
the President lied. A newsworthy lie represents a near perfect collapse
of the expression/idea distinction. Conceptually, it was the words
themselves that were the lie. The words were the expression and the lie
the idea. It would have been nearly impossible to communicate the idea
that the President lied, without his expression. One could accuse
someone of being a liar, or lying, but that cannot communicate the idea
with the same factual accuracy that the actual expression that contained
the lie does. It was not as if the expression taken in this case was
something independent of the lie that could have been expressed by
different words and kept the same meaning or newsworthiness. This is
different from a merger because the underlying idea behind the speech,
which could possibly be saved by the merger doctrine, is irrelevant.
Essentially, the idea behind Ford's words (which was mainly selfjustification) was not that important, but words showing he lied were
very important.
It should not have been a difficult concept for the Court, because
the same collapsing of the distinction exists in perjury cases. The words
themselves are the perjury. The Court in a perjury case does not rely on
a separate paraphrase that relates the independent significance of the
words as lies in a different way. The same applies here. Without the
expression, the concept could not have been expressed. Another area
where the idea/expression distinction runs into problems is with
parodies. 80 Mel Marquis points out that the expression of the song is
exactly what is being parodied, not the idea behind it, yet the court has
upheld a wide variety of parodies of copyrighted material.18' The Court

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 395.
Id. at 382.
Id. at 382-83.
Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 572.
Mel Marquis, Comment, Fair Use of the FirstAmendment: Parody and Its Protections 8

SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 123, 123-24 (1987).

181.

Id.
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simply ignores the operation of the distinction with trivial expression,
but when the expression strikes at the health of a functioning democracy,
such as when the President is lying to the public, it becomes of huge
legal importance. In addition to the legal problems the idea/expression
distinction faces, many linguists and philosophers of language have
largely abandoned it.' 8 2 And even those that would keep some version
and without consideration as the
of it, do not assume its truth as casually
183
Court often does in major decisions.
That, however, does not mean the values that justify the First
Amendment cannot be integrated with copyright law. As mentioned, the
Eldred and Harper & Row dissents make it clear they are attempting that
very integration.' 8 4 If Justices Breyer and Brennan can do it, it can be
done. 185 The decisions in the cases analyzed above go out of their way
to say they are considering First Amendment concerns. But to do so, the
Court only relies on the most superficial analysis. The Court never goes
past a mention of fair use and the idea/expression dichotomy to actually
see whether there is fair use and whether the distinction is sufficient to
adequately protect the First Amendment. 186 The best test to see if
copyright law really does peacefully coexist with the First Amendment
is to apply the underlying values and justifications to actual and
hypothetical copyright cases that implicate the First Amendment.
The obvious counterargument to this is that if the doctrines are
sufficiently distinct as to not lead to differing results, why even reach the
level of theoretical justifications? Harper & Row could have sought an
injunction against The Nation, and, based on the copyright analysis of
the Court, they would have deserved one. However, in the Pentagon
, when the government sought an injunction their
Papers case 187th
argument was roundly dismissed by the Court, even though the
government lawyers in the Pentagon Papers relied on state88 secrets
doctrine, one of the strongest reasons possible, for their request. 1

182. See JOHN SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY (The Free Press 1995).
Unfortunately there is not space here to analyze the philosophical problems with this distinction in
depth.
183. Many times, it is just tossed in as a paragraph as if it were completely self-explanatory
and always functioning.
184. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 590 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 224
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
185. The best proof of possibility is actuality.
186. See, e.g., Harper& Row, 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Eldred, 537 U.S. 186 (2002).
187. New York Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
188. See note 188, infra.
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It would appear from these two cases that outcomes differ based on
what kind of analysis the Court uses. Had President Ford sought an
injunction saying The Nation had criticized him, his argument would
have been laughed out of court and would never have reached the
Supreme Court. And had the Pentagon fought instead on an interest in
publishing the Pentagon Papers themselves through an outside
corporation like RAND, they would have been entitled to an injunction.
If two doctrines really are complementary, they should not lead to
radically different results. Because they lead to different results, it is
necessary to examine the problem at the theoretical level.
III. WHY WE HAVE THE FIRST

AMENDMENT AND THE

CONFLICT WITH COPYRIGHT

The first theoretical justification of the First Amendment's
protection of speech is the personal liberty and aesthetic freedom model.
This justification has the most potential to support both sides of the
debate. If we look at Harper & Row, we can see these competing
concerns. The very first concern for a personal expression justification
is the importance of allusions to literary expression. Literature and
aesthetics, in general, rest on a foundation of allusion. Countless movies
and novels recall Shakespeare.1 89 Philosophy cannot exist without its
history. Ironically, even the title of Ford's memoirs and the subject of
Harper& Row are biblical allusions and quotes of Ecclesiastes 3.3.190
The second obvious concern we see is that of Ford and his
publisher. Not only do individuals have the right to speak, but they also
have some right to choose when and where to speak. 9' One does not
need to speculate to assume that where to publish his memoirs was a
significant concern to Ford. Time magazine, while often critical of
government, is by all accounts a mainstream establishment publication.
The Nation, however, is one of the most progressive or liberal major
magazines in circulation. The Nation article, included in the Harper &
Row appendix, savaged Ford; whereas the Time article, had it run, would
have almost certainly glowingly portrayed Ford. And if not glowing, the
worst Time would have done is focus on the tough choices and bad
situation President Ford was put in by President Nixon's resignation.

189. See, e.g., 10 THINGS I HATE ABOUT YOU (Touchstone Pictures 1999).
190. Ecclesiastes 3.3.
191. Though of course time and place regulations may have something to say about exactly
when and where.
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Another critical concern for individual expression is when that
expression takes place. That concern about timing was clearly violated
in Harper & Row. However, other authors, none as famously as Kafka,
92
have fretted and delayed publication, insisting the time was not right.
Literary and aesthetic history would be radically different today if Max
Brod had rushed one of his 'edited' Kafka novels to publication before
Kafka was ready. The same would be true if an unscrupulous publisher
had excerpted the drafts that Brod shopped around to try to get a
publishing contract for his friend.
Artists also have an interest in how their work is used, and are
understandably unhappy when their work is put to opposite or
unapproved uses. Tom Waits brought a successful lawsuit against Frito
Lay for using the themes intended for an anti advertising song in an
advertisement for Doritos. 93 A weak copyright system would allow
other artists' work to be used in the same way. An anti-consumerism
song, like Waits' could be parodied into an advertising song just as a
religious song could be parodied into an irreligious work and vice versa.
Artists and others involved in expressive pursuits would seem to
benefit more from a strong copyright than they are hurt by it. The
interest in allusion like Ford's title would be protected by even the
weakest fair use. But what of the justifications put forward by Justice
Breyer? Beyond the benefits to the professional artists, 94 how does
copyright affect the bar for participation?
Fair use has failed to allow broad access to sampling in music, one
of the most significant new areas of art. Sampling is taking a short
sample from a song or video and re-contextualizing or somehow reusing
it. The practice is especially prominent in hip-hop and other kinds of
electronic music. The songs appropriated range from James Brown's
"Funky Drummer" to the most obscure private pressing rock records.
The artists involved also range from the unknown to the Notorious
' 95
B.I.G., who landed in court for sampling "The Ohio Players."'
Sampling significantly brings down the cost of album production. Its
rise in the 70s and 80s essentially allowed basement producers to invent
an entirely new genre of music that reflected new and different concerns.
This kind of expression is crucial for First Amendment theory. The new
lower cost of music making, thanks to sampling, brought a massive
influx in musical participation from people and groups that otherwise
192.
193.
194.
195.

REINER STACH, KAFKA THE DECISIVE YEARS (Shelly Frisch trans., Harcourt 2005).
Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 1992).
Weird Al excepted, of course.
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs Publ'g, 507 F.3d 470,476 (6th Cir. 2007).
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may not have been heard. This led to many things we regard now as
commonplace in music, with albums using these techniques being
platinum sellers for the past decade. What is important to note here is
that fair use did
not protect a single hip-hop pioneer like Biz Markie or
196
many others.

The second theoretical justification for the First Amendment is the
marketplace of ideas model. This model actually works the best with
copyright law, even without fair use, as long as licensing works. If we
take the metaphor far too literally, the same marketplace will function in
both settings. If a Rolling Stones sample is worth putting in a song, it
will make the song good enough to sell enough copies to pay the Rolling
Stones for the sample. Though Milton Friedman might like this, it is not
how it would work out, often the most innovative works, sell the least.
Another significant problem with the marketplace theory is that each
sample could be priced higher than the last if it were the one that
completed the song; it would be like the value of the baseball card that
completed the set to a collector. That would reward holdouts for nothing
more than delaying the process. That would create an incentive for
everyone who had a sample to license, to license it last, to get the highest
price.
Whether or not the metaphors analogize nicely with each other does
not answer the real question. The barriers to entry would weight against
the alleged infringer the same way as they do in the analysis for
individual expression above. A weak copyright system and very broad
First Amendment protections would allow people into the discussion for
less money. But, at first glance, it does not appear that copyright law
has much impact on the second important part of the marketplace theory:
the discernment that brings the selection mechanism of competition into
play. Historical art markets are not the best model for rational economic
competition, so we have to look farther back towards the general theory.
At its root, marketplace theory could be phrased as a simple question: to
what extent is the law erecting artificial barriers between the competition
of ideas? Copyright, with the fair use defense, does place limits on the
market for ideas, but those limits are essentially the same as what was
already shown above for sampling. So a bottom line conclusion is that a

moderate expansion of the fair use defense would be sufficient for the
literal marketplace half of the justification of the marketplace theory.

196. Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182, 183-85
(D.N.Y. 1991).
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The abbreviated marketplace analysis above focuses merely on half
of the marketplace of ideas theory, the literal markets. But it leaves out
the political marketplace. And that half of the marketplace theory is
where fair use fails to protect First Amendment justifications.
The second half of the political marketplace is best analyzed in
conjunction with the third theoretical justification of the First
Amendment. That is that the First Amendment defends the free flow of
political ideas. If copyright and fair use fail to take account of the
political justification for the limited theory that the First Amendment
serves mainly to protect political speech, it necessarily would fail to
protect political speech in the marketplace theory. Essentially, copyright
and fair use either defend the free flow of political ideas or they do not,
regardless of whether the justification is analyzed from a political
marketplace of ideas model or a broader analysis that includes both the
market model and the other ways the First Amendment protects political
ideas. The above mere marketplace analysis leads to the conclusion that
fair use is not broad enough to meet the demands of the political ideas
justification because it cannot even meet the lower general marketplace
theory. The perfect example of this failure of fair use to protect political
ideas is Harper & Row. Upon reading it, one wonders if maybe
classifying the Pentagon Papers instead of outsourcing them to the
RAND Corporation and copyrighting them was a mistake. '9' In the
Pentagon Papers case, Daniel Ellsberg, a military analyst,
surreptitiously smuggled a classified Defense Department summary of
the Vietnam War out of his office, made copies, and leaked the copies to
the press.' 98 The Supreme Court issued a per curium opinion soundly
rejecting an injunction sought by the government.' 9 9 In his concurrence,
Justice Douglas goes so as far to say that the "dominant purpose of the
First Amendment was to prohibit the widespread practice of
governmental suppression of embarrassing information. '' 200 One can
imagine what the outcome would have been in Harper & Row if the
majority opinion had contained that sentence.
As was mentioned in the section above about doctrinal issues
unique to the First Amendment, there was no injunction in Harper &
Row. 20 ' However, the decision is very clear that the First Amendment,
in the majority view, is not implicated. Moreover, if the First

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

See New York Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
Id at714.
Id.
New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 723-24 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 543-47.
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Amendment is not implicated, Harper & Row could have received an
injunction. The crucial distinction the court made in the Pentagon
Papers case was present in Harper & Row as well. That was that the
defendant was The Nation, not the one who stole the text, just as the
defendant was The New York Times, and not Daniel Ellsberg.
Another interesting part of Harper & Row was the balancing
between newsworthiness and motive. The Court in Harper & Row held
that the President admitting to lying to the American people, about both
criminal abuses of power and the largest scandal in modem history, was
not newsworthy because the newsworthiness of such an admission was
swallowed by the motive to scoop.20 2 This is about as clear as an
indication as possible that the newsworthiness exception contained
within fair use is almost meaningless. This is because the motive to
scoop is unavoidable in any context where newsworthiness is an issue.
Of course, there is a motive to scoop. That is what the media does with
the news! Interestingly, the Court in International News Service v.
Associated Press held that while there was no general property interest
in the news itself, a wire service was infringed on when its competition
took its whole articles. 20 3
But that decision involved identical
information presented in the same manner, they literally took the entire
wire stories word for word. 2 4 In Harper & Row, the difference is a
glowing presentation of Ford in his own words, and a negative portrayal
of Ford that contained some direct quotations. If, in InternationalNews
Service, the competing wire service had merely taken the occasional
quote by the public figure and was not simply repackaging the
Associated Press stories for wholesale redistribution, the result probably
would have been different.

IV.

ANOTHER POSSIBLE DIRECTION FOR THE
FIRST AMENDMENT AND COPYRIGHT

A few lower courts have shown a willingness to give First
Amendment concerns a stronger hearing. The amount of deference and
the analysis has varied, but in Keep Thompson Governor Committee v.
Citizens for Gallen. National Rifle Association of America v. Handgun
Control Federationof Ohio. and Hustler Magazine v. Moral Majority,

202. See id.
203. See Int'i News Serv. v. AP, 248 U.S. 215 (U.S.
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315 (1967)).
204. Id. at 231.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009

1918) (overruling recognized by

27

Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 3 [2009], Iss. 2, Art. 7
AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

[3:351

the courts have considered the First Amendment relevant to copyright
law and in all the cases, the courts found fair use.205
The Circuit Court in Thompson got it right.2 °6 In this case, one
candidate for governor issued a record that contained a song on the Aside and policy provisions on the B-side.2 °7 The opposing candidate ran
a commercial that began with roughly 15 seconds of the other
campaign's song at the beginning, followed by criticisms of the other
candidate's policies.20 8 The plaintiff asked for an injunction and the
court found against them.20 9
The court in Thompson finds both standing and copyright, but
rather than skipping from there to fair use, it makes the First
Amendment concerns explicit. 210 The court states that since this is
political discourse, it is a First Amendment issue, and that it must apply
fair use with that in mind. 21' The court then finds a conflict between the
First Amendment and copyright, so in order for fair use to take account
of the First Amendment; this particular use has to be fair use.212
Now this analysis may not seem extremely different from that in
Harper & Row, but the order of the argument shows a completely
different process at work. Both courts start with infringement. Next, the
Harper & Row court argues that since copyright and the First
Amendment are both constitutional and precedent has shown fair use
protects the First Amendment, if there is a First Amendment problem,
fair use will solve it.2 13 In Thompson, the Court seriously analyzes
whether there is a First Amendment problem, before going to fair use.214
The finding that there is a First Amendment conflict leads almost
inevitably to successful use of the fair use defense. The Court, in
Harper & Row. weighs the fair use factors independent of the First
Amendment concerns. 215 The Supreme Court seems to have essentially
already determined, a priori, that fair use is an adequate stand in for

205. See Keep Thompson Governor Comm. v. Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp. 957
(D.N.H. 1978); Nat'i Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Handgun Control Fed'n, 15 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. Ohio
1994); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 1526 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
206. Keep Thompson Governor Comm. v. Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp. 957
(D.N.H.1978).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 959.
209. Id. at 961.
210. Id. at 959.
211. Id. at959-60.
212. Id. at 960.
213. See Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 539.
214. Thompson, 457 F. Supp. at 959-60.
215. See Harperand Row, 471 U.S. at 539.
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actual First Amendment analysis. To try and restate this, in Harper &
Row the Court is saying if the infringement is not fair use it is not a First
Amendment issue. In Thompson, the court is saying if it is in conflict
with the First Amendment, it has to be fair use.
The Handgun Control Federation (HCF) had reproduced a copy of
a list of state legislators in their newsletter that had been prepared by the
NRA.2 16 Both sides were trying to rally supporters around a bill banning
handguns and other automatic weapons.21 7 It was uncontested that the
HCF had simply photocopied the NRA's list and placed it in their
newsletter.21 8 The NRA sued for copyright infringement. 2 9 The circuit
court dismissed the suit, ruling that the NRA could not copyright the list;
the appellate court then affirmed based on HCF's fair use of the
material.22 o
The court ran through the fair use factors with the standard
analysis. 221 But it also stated that HCF's newsletter implicated their
First Amendment rights, and that the newsletter was primarily for them
"to comment on public issues and petition the government regarding
legislation., 222 Based on that, the court said, "[t]he scope of the fair use
223
doctrine is wider when the use relates to issues of public concern."
Since a broader scope for fair use was necessary because of the First
Amendment values, it would follow that the standard scope was not
broad enough to protect the First Amendment. Simply running through
the four factors would not necessarily protect the full concerns of the
First Amendment.
The third case that held that the First Amendment broadened fair
use was Hustler Magazine v. Moral Majority.224 Jerry Falwell, Moral
Majority, and the Old Time Gospel Hour sent out fundraising
solicitations that contained a Hustler parody of a Campari ad.225 The
parody implied that Falwell lost his virginity to his mother in an
outhouse.22 6 The fundraising letters were part of a campaign to say that

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Nat ' Rifle Ass 'n ofAm., 15 F.3d at 560.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 561.
Id. at 562.
Id.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 606 F. Supp. at 1532, 1536.
Id. at 1529-30.
Id.at 1529.
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views and that he needed
Falwell himself was under attack for his
227
money to combat people like Larry Flynt.
Hustler then sued Falwell and his related organizations for
copyright infringement for their use of the copyrighted Hustler ad in
their fundraising letters. 22' There was no question of whether Hustler
had copyrighted the material, so the court proceeded to the defendant's
fair use defense. 229 However, before analyzing the four factors, the court
stated, "[t]he determination of fair use... involves applying the statutory
factors with careful attention to the policies behind the copyright laws as
well as First Amendment considerations." 230 This is an explicit
statement that fair use cannot be considered in isolation. The court
particularly focused on whether infringement, "occurs in the course of a
political, social, or moral debate, the public interest in free expression is
one factor favoring a finding of fair use.",23 ' The court then uses this
factor to find fair use, saying that the copying occurs within precisely the
context of2 public debate that the First Amendment and fair use have to
23
protect.
Unfortunately for the First Amendment, Harper& Row is a modem
Supreme Court decision with great value as a precedent and Thompson,
NRA, and Hustler are just lower court decisions. Taken together
however, they show a different route of analysis. It seems that whenever
a court does not simply take for granted that the enumerated factors in
fair use protect the First Amendment, they end up broadening fair use as
they did in the three cases cited above. But that analysis is still strictly a
minority position. In addition, if the recent news is any indication, there
is no sign society will be moving away from Harper & Row towards
Thompson any time soon. Douglas McCullough, a judge in North
Carolina, recently threatened YouTube, demanding that a video of a
public campaign speech he gave be removed from the site, claiming
copyright.23 3 In the speech, he claimed that the Republican Party would
get a better deal in redistricting cases if he and his fellow Republican
YouTube had no interest in even
judges were elected next year. 3
asserting fair use and simply took the video down. That decision makes
227. Id. at 1530.
228. Id. at 1529.
229. Id. at 1531.
230. Id. at 1532.
231. Id. at 1536.
232. Id.
233. Doug Clark, Judges should be independent, not partisan, NEWS RECORD, Oct. 31, 2007,
http://blog.news-record.com/staff/offltherecord/archives/2007/10/believe it-or-n.shtml.
234. Id.
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business sense for them, since there is little money to be made in being
sued to try to protect a third party's video and its attendant speech rights.
Therefore, if anything, the power of copyright will only grow in the
internet age if sites that were supposed to lower the barrier to
participation cave at the slightest allegation of copyright violations.
V. CONCLUSION

Fair use as it has been construed by the courts, is generally
insufficient to protect the underlying justifications of the First
Amendment. Copyright serves as a barrier to participation under the
individual liberty expression theory and in the marketplace of ideas.
Thanks to cases like Harper & Row, fair use is so limited as to be
insufficient to save any of the underlying justifications for the First
Amendment by itself.
Despite some cases that come out for strong First Amendment
protections, like Thompson, NRA, and Hustler the Supreme Court has
typically favored copyright concerns over First Amendment concerns
with decisions like Harper& Row. The high barriers courts have placed
on participation in sampling cases and the emerging YouTube cases
suggest that this trend will only worsen. The hope here is that
Thompson, NRA, and Hustler point out a meaningful possibility of
analysis that could protect the First Amendment. Essentially, these cases
use the First Amendment analysis with fair use concurrently, almost as if
the First Amendment is the fifth factor. Of course, critics would say that
it would weaken copyright protections, but that alone does not mean the
law cannot meet the constitutional role of copyright, while protecting the
First Amendment. As long as fair use does not become so broad as to
keep people from creating new works, it still meets the justification for
copyright. To prevent people from being able to discuss politicians'
behavior in office in the hopes that they will write more memoirs is
absurd.
If Congress is unwilling to rewrite the copyright statute to broaden
fair use to protect the First Amendment, the courts must step forward.
This would not require a wholesale declaration of copyright as
unconstitutional; simply applying the analytical steps of Thompson, NRA
and Hustler would be sufficient.
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